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Reframing Eleanor Roosevelt’s
Influence in the 1930s Anti-
Lynching Movement around a ‘New
Philosophy of Government’
Melissa Cooper
1 Lynching and mob violence spiked at the beginning of the 1930s as racial tensions
heightened  during  the  Great  Depression.i With  growing  public  concern  over  the
treatment of black Americans, President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced increasing domestic
and international pressure to curtail mob violence. Even German Chancellor Adolf Hitler
wrote to FDR in “protest against an uncivilized custom of broiling helpless victims by
mobs,” and encouraged FDR to deplore mob violence. “I would consider it a great favor,”
he wrote, “if you would use your own good and powerful office to better protect your
defensless [sic] black people.”ii Similarly, leading American civil rights activists pressured
the President for a federal solution to lynching throughout the decade. Recognising FDR’s
willingness  to  push  through legislation  to  aid  national  recovery  in  the  wake  of  the
economic  crisis,  prominent  organisations  such  as  the  National  Association  for  the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) hoped that the President would also lend his
powers to aid the campaign for civil rights.
2 With the belief that every citizen, regardless of race, was entitled to due process, the
NAACP resolved that it was the role of the state to be a guarantor of justice. Between 1934
and 1935, the NAACP lobbied the White House for its support of the Costigan-Wagner
federal  anti-lynching  bill.  Named  after  Democratic  Senators  Edward  P.  Costigan  of
Colorado and Robert F. Wagner of New York, the bill outlined provisions for the federal
government  to  prosecute  participants  in  lynch  mobs,  public  officials,  and  law
enforcement officers  who failed to protect  prisoners in their  custody against  a  mob.
Ultimately  the  Costigan-Wagner  bill,  as  well  as  all  subsequent  attempts  to  legislate
against lynching, did not succeed; every bill fell victim to a filibuster in the Senate and no
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anti-lynching legislation was ever passed by Congress. It was because of these anticipated
filibusters and southern objections to anti-lynching legislation during the 1930s that the
NAACP pursued presidential endorsement of their bill so doggedly. The benefits of this
endorsement  would  have  been incredibly  valuable  to  the  NAACP as  the  presidential
actions that could result in the passage of their anti-lynching bill were numerous.iii
3 In theory the liberalism espoused by the FDR aligned with the liberalism championed
by the NAACP as both advocated greater state intervention to remedy social inequalities:
the Association maintained that it was the federal government’s responsibility to protect
black lives  and the  New Deal  offered hope to  reformers  who sought  greater  federal
intervention in  problems  such as  poverty,  poor  housing,  and unemployment.  But  in
practice, FDR remained silent on the bills and did not accede to the NAACP’s demands.
FDR even told NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White that he would not endorse the
bill. In a 1934 meeting with Walter White at the White House, FDR was reported to have
said, “If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, [Southern Senators] will block every
bill I ask Congress to pass.”iv Despite this, the NAACP continued to pressure FDR for his
support in the hope that if the President recognised the need for such a bill he would
endorse the Association’s efforts.
4 But as FDR’s White House staff tried to keep White and the controversial subject of
anti-lynching  from  the  president’s  attention,  the  NAACP  corresponded  with  Eleanor
Roosevelt in order to develop an alternate route through which to reach the president.
There is wide-sweeping academic agreement regarding Eleanor Roosevelt’s part in the
1930s anti-lynching movement. Her role as conduit between FDR and Walter White has
been uncontended for decades and her influence has always been regarded as positive.
Current interpretations of Mrs. Roosevelt’s influence in the anti-lynching movement can
been split into two categories. The first concerns the impact it had on her own reputation
and public image. Scholars such as Tamara K. Hareven and Mildred Abramowitz praised
Mrs. Roosevelt for her work with black Americans. They suggested that she was ahead of
her  time,  and  in  many  cases  single-handedly  fought  discrimination  and  promoted
equality to Americans in such a way that they would not lose their American ideals.v Her
willingness to engage with black social issues such as lynching therefore benefited her
own image and is seen as evidence of her personal political views.
5 The second line of interpretation considers the effect of Mrs. Roosevelt’s actions on
how black Americans perceived FDR. As James R. Kearney argued, when FDR was unable
or unwilling to endorse anti-lynching legislation, Mrs. Roosevelt reassured the NAACP of
the  President’s  interest,  and  placed  the  administration  in  opposition  to  lynching.
Consequently, the First Lady assured black audiences that it was “not the intention of
those at the top” that black Americans should be subject to discrimination.vi Nancy J.
Weiss, and later Doris Kearns Goodwin argued that such comments, combined with Mrs.
Roosevelt’s  willingness  to  engage  with  black  Americans,  boosted  the  image  of  the
administration.  In  Kearns  Goodwin’s  book  No  Ordinary  Time,  the  author  noted  that
“though the president had taken no specific initiatives in behalf of the Negroes, and had
failed to support the anti-lynching campaign,  he managed,  with Eleanor’s  substantial
help, to convey to blacks that the administration was on their side.”vii Mrs. Roosevelt’s
efforts therefore contributed to a shift in the black vote from Republican to Democrat
during FDR’s second term elections as her rapport with the black electorate reflected well
upon her husband.viii
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6 Because Mrs. Roosevelt acted as an unofficial representative of the administration,
her communications need to be understood in light of FDR’s attitude towards lynching
and the political position that he espoused. This will show how effectively Mrs. Roosevelt
communicated  the  administration’s  position  to  the  NAACP  and  will  highlight  her
intentions in the messages she conveyed. For this reason, this article first considers FDR’s
anti-lynching rhetoric to establish FDR’s views on lynching. While scholars have argued
that FDR shied away from lynching and the anti-lynching movement to maintain the
support of southern senators for his economic policies, in fact, FDR spoke about lynching
three times during this period.ix The rhetoric in these speeches challenges the traditional
narrative surrounding FDR and lynching and suggests that FDR wanted to bring lynching
under the umbrella of his federal crime control reforms, in doing so distancing himself
from the NAACP’s anti-lynching bill.     
7 This essay then reinterprets Eleanor Roosevelt’s role as conduit between FDR and the
NAACP  in  light  of  FDR’s  views.  Accordingly,  this  study  argues  that  through  wishful
thinking  and enduring  optimism,  in  her  correspondence  with  Walter  White,  Eleanor
Roosevelt placed the administration in support of the NAACP’s federal anti-lynching bill,
a bill that FDR did not support. Consequently, this heightened tensions between FDR and
the NAACP, who expected FDR to act on the Costigan-Wagner bill’s behalf. The intention
in this article is to interrogate one of Mrs. Roosevelt’s early attempts as First Lady to
intervene in national politics. Her role in this instance came at a time when she was
unsure of her reach as First Lady. After only a year in the White House, Mrs. Roosevelt
was uncertain of how far she could go to support controversial  causes,  such as anti-
lynching  and  desegregation,  without  damaging  FDR’s  political  aspirations.  Mrs.
Roosevelt’s communications with anti-lynching activists reveal that her own attempts at
domestic  diplomacy  drew  upon  her  previous  political  experience  in  order  to  build
relations  between  black  reformers  and  the  administration  in  the  1930s.  But  what
scholarship has neglected to-date, and this article seeks to reconcile, is how her actions
impacted on relations between the NAACP and FDR, and how they affected the NAACP’s
political aspirations.
 
FDR’s Stance on Lynching
8 When Eleanor Roosevelt acted as a conduit between the Walter White and FDR she often
directly relayed messages between the two men, in doing so she shared the President’s
thoughts on lynching. FDR’s stance on lynching and anti-lynching have typically been
defined by his public silence on the NAACP’s federal anti-lynching bills. This silence has
previously been explained and excused by FDR’s need to keep quiet on controversial
subjects in order to push through his New Deal Economic reforms.x His aides argued that
it  would not be politically expedient for him to be associated with the anti-lynching
movement and often purposefully kept anti-lynching from his attention. This essay does
not  contest  that  FDR  distanced  himself  from  the  bills.  It  does,  however,  challenge
accepted notions about FDR’s stance on lynching and anti-lynching. 
9 While FDR avoided talking about specific anti-lynching bills, he confronted lynching
throughout  his  presidency  and  spoke  about  it  three  times  between  1933  and  1935.
Surprisingly, scholars have neglected to analyse FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric. But this is
largely because FDR spoke rarely on civil rights issues and even more infrequently about
lynching. These speeches,  however,  clearly outline FDR’s position on the subject,  and
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reveal that just like his New Deal economic reforms that aimed to build on “the ruins of
the past,” FDR framed lynching in the language of social and political disrepair, extending
his ‘new philosophy of government’ to combat lynching.xi While FDR did not outline any
specific policies on lynching during this time his speeches suggested he wished to expand
the powers of the federal government to allow it to fight lynching. FDR’s practice of using
rhetoric  to  frame future  policy  refers  to  what  scholars  have  deemed ‘the  rhetorical
presidency,’ an essential feature of the ‘modern presidency.’xii As he did with his New Deal
reforms, FDR also rhetorically framed lynching during his first term as president. When
FDR appeared to take no action on lynching, instead he laid the foundations for future
federal action by establishing his own anti-lynching rhetoric. This essay therefore first
considers FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric between 1933 and 1935—the period when he was
seen to take the least action against lynching—to understand his position on lynching and
how he legitimised potential future federal reforms against the practice.
10 In December 1933, FDR spoke for the first time about lynching in a speech to the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (FCC). FDR asserted that “we know that
[lynching] is murder and a deliberate and definite disobedience of the Commandment,
‘Thou shall not kill.’”xiii While on the surface the President appeared to merely denounce
mob violence, the broader context of the speech actually contained the seed of what
would become FDR’s public strategy towards lynching during his time in office.xiv
11 Up until  the 1930s lynching had been largely understood to be a consequence of
cultural conflict with social and economic causes, yet during his speech FDR presented a
simplified explanation for lynching.xv Just like America’s other social ills, he suggested,
lynching was just another sign of a country in disrepair. First and foremost, lynching was
a symptom of broken government: “The judicial function of government is the protection
of the individual and of the community through quick and certain justice. That function
in many places has fallen into a sad state of disrepair.”xvi FDR highlighted that lynching
had flourished because the function of government had been inadequate. While lynching
has been talked about in terms of the law for a century by social commentators, activists,
and journalists—even the NAACP made these arguments to justify federal intervention—
the federal government had never openly recognised this until this point.
12 FDR attributed the  state  of  government  to  a  detrimental  cultural  exchange that
resulted in the corruption of those in “high places.” There was no longer a “great gulf
that separated the privileged from the underprivileged,” he mused, and values of low
culture had seeped into those of the ruling elite. But, FDR declared, “we do not excuse
those in high places or in low who condone lynch law,” and deplored law enforcement
officers who took part in the practice. In order to fix the situation, “it must be part of our
program to re-establish [the proper function of government].”xvii The solution to mob
murder,  according to  FDR,  was  to  tackle  the  root  cause;  lynching was  a  problem of
government that could in turn be solved by the function of  government.  Since their
founding the NAACP framed lynching in terms of race and the law, whereas FDR firmly
framed lynching in terms of the law and only the law.xviii FDR had turned lynching into a
colour-blind issue that had a colour-blind solution.
13 In  no  uncertain  terms  FDR situated  his  anti-lynching  rhetoric  firmly  within  the
context of his nation-building New Deal policies that legitimised the expansion of federal
powers  in the national  interest.  Crime,  just  like  economic crises,  could be solved by
strong  government,  he  argued.  FDR  therefore  called  for  “action  by  collective
government… toward the ending of  practices such as [lynching].”xix FDR brought the
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rhetoric of  civil  rights in line with his  other policies byframing mob violence in the
bureaucratic language of the New Deal. But this was a significant speech as it clearly
marked FDR’s desire to end lynching and hinted at how it might be achieved. 
14 Following FDR’s denouncement of lynching in his speech to the FCC the NAACP were
convinced of  FDR’s  interest  in  seeing an end to  lynching.  Walter  White  even sent  a
telegram to the President expressing his gratitude. “Thank you a thousand times,” White
exclaimed,  “for your magnificent and unequivocal  condemnation of lynching tonight.
Twelve million negroes and many millions of whites applaud your every word.”xx The
excitement  of  a  presidential  statement  condemning  lynching  and  advocating  federal
action meant that NAACP activists expected FDR to progress towards an endorsement of
their federal anti-lynching bill. Consequently, White bombarded the White House with
letters and telegrams imploring the President to speak out in favour of the Costigan-
Wagner  bill.  Stephen Early,  FDR’s  Press  Secretary  commented  that  “[White’s]  file  of
correspondence is  voluminous,” as he relentlessly sought presidential  endorsement.xxi
While FDR’s first speech unequivocally denounced lynching it was vague on the details
about how the federal government would quash the practice. Given the NAACP had a
ready-made next step in the form of their anti-lynching bill, it made sense to them that
FDR would go on to endorse their bill. While the NAACP advocated their Costigan-Wagner
bill, the President would later suggest a solution that extended federal powers to make
law enforcement more effective to tackle such crimes. 
15 Proving that his comments on lynching in his speech to the FCC were not a one-off,
the President reaffirmed his commitment to stop lynching a month later in his State of
the Union Address on 3rd January 1934. FDR claimed that “crimes of organized banditry,
cold-blooded shooting, lynching, and kidnapping have threatened our security.”xxii He
called for their “immediate suppression” and asked the Congress to cooperate, to build “a
new structure designed better to meet the present problems of modern civilization.”xxiii
While lynching was not a primary focus of the State of the Union address, it’s inclusion in
the speech indicated a firm desire for the eradication of lynching. The State of the Union
address  typically  allows  the  president  to  recommend  issues  to  Congress  for  their
consideration. Given that in the rest of the speech FDR mentioned providing further relief
for unemployment, regulating business, ending crimes that stemmed from prohibition,
seeking repayment of debts owed by foreign nations, and taxation reform—all areas that
he  later  took  action  on—his  inclusion  of  lynching  in  this  particular  speech  was  a
compelling indicator that anti-lynching was on the president’s agenda. 
16 FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric was inextricably bound with his rhetoric surrounding
the ‘war on crime.’ The war on crime was an initiative that saw the federal government
expand their role towards crime control to tackle crimes—broadly those mentioned by
FDR in his State of the Union Address—which developed out of the prohibition era.xxiv In
order to achieve this,  under FDR’s advisement,  the Department of Justice proposed a
legislative program for tackling crime that Attorney General Homer Cummings deemed
the ‘Twelve Point Program.’xxv The Program dealt with racketeering, the transportation of
stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce, stealing from banks operating under
the laws of the United States,  fleeing the state to avoid prosecution or the giving of
testimony, to name just a few.xxvi But both the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) pursued agendas that would increase federal authority to tackle a range of crimes
during the first half of the 1930s. Whilst a provision to make lynching a federal crime was
not explicitly a part of this program, FDR’s anti-lynching rhetoric suggested that federal
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powers could be expanded to tackle lynching in the same way. Historian Clare Potter
offered an explanation for the absence of lynching on the programme by arguing that the
war on crime “projected a vision of a moral and efficient state,” designed to rally white
middle class  voters  around the New Deal  and increased federal  intervention without
disturbing racial or class hierarchies.xxvii Open support for an anti-lynching measure was
likely to lose FDR support. But in extending federal powers to fight crime more broadly,
lynching could be tackled by the institutions of federal law enforcement.
17 Evidence of an alternate approach to tackling lynching came at an address given by
FDR to a national conference on crime convened by Attorney General Homer Cummings
between 10th and 13th December 1934.xxviii The conference met to discuss the future of
federal crime control and was attended by six hundred representatives from national,
state,  and  local  institutions  as  well  as  independent  organisations.xxix The  conference
appealed to its delegates for ideas on how to transform federal crime control and FDR
gave an address to the delegates that escalated his anti-lynching rhetoric and revealed his
own remedy for lawlessness. His address featured recurrent themes from his previous
speeches  showing  that  lynching  would  be  included  in  a  broader  program for  crime
control.
18 FDR advocated a disimpassioned response to lynching. In doing so he attempted to
divert public attention away from the crime itself towards more practical solutions. “At
one moment  popular  resentment  and anger  may be  roused by an outbreak of  some
particular  form  of  crime  such,  for  example,  as  widespread  banditry;  or  at  another
moment,  of  appalling kidnappings;  or at another,  of  widespread drug peddling;  or at
another,  of  horrifying lynchings.”  But  the American people,  Roosevelt  argued,  “must
realize the many implications of that word ‘crime.’ It is not enough that they become
interested  in  one  phase  only.”xxx While  FDR  mentioned  lynching,  he  only  did  so  to
reinforce his point that the crime could not be reduced by targeting the perpetrators
alone.  In doing so,  he distanced himself  from the NAACP’s Costigan-Wagner bill  that
focused specifically on lynching and bringing lynchers to justice.
19 With no specific crimes on the agenda, it was clear that this conference was about the
function of federal government and how to make it a more effective machine for tackling
crime.  FDR  asserted  that  the  federal  government  was  not  prepared  to  deal  with
contemporary crime and lamented that criminals “have been better equipped and better
organized than have the officials who are supposed to keep them in check.” According to
the  conference  programme,  the  delegates  considered  “crime  prevention,  detection,
apprehension,  police  administration,  prosecution,  court  organization  and
administration.”xxxi There were significant problems with many of these phases of crime
control that had been identified as contributing factors in lynchings.  Some lynchings
were  advertised  in  advance  and  could  have  been  prevented  with  a  more  efficient
response  from  law  enforcement.  Additionally,  law  enforcement  had  trouble  in
apprehending lynchers; members of mobs frequently absconded, or were well known to
have taken part in a mob but were still  never apprehended. Few lynchers were ever
prosecuted at local or state level either, indicating that there were several aspects of the
criminal  justice system and crime control  practices which could be reformed to stop
lynchings.
20 FDR made a direct  statement regarding the increase of  federal  power,  and more
specifically, its capability to tackle crime. The President proclaimed that, “Widespread
increase in capacity to substitute order for disorder is the remedy.”xxxii This was a distinct
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rhetorical escalation from a year earlier when he had only alluded to the idea of federal
intervention. It reflected the nature of FDR’s rhetorical methods. He would float an idea
and then gradually strengthen the rhetoric surrounding it until he could assert what he
wanted, and felt that he would be supported. 
21 It appeared then, that both the NAACP and FDR had the same goal: for the federal
government to take responsibility for lynching. FDR’s methods for doing so, however,
were profoundly dissimilar to the NAACP’s.  Instead of endorsing the NAACP’s federal
anti-lynching bill that sought to bring lynchers to justice—something that would have
hurt his broader New Deal legislative agenda, FDR used strategic rhetoric in speeches to
suggest  that a better way to stop lynching was to expand the powers of  federal law
enforcement to make the state more effective at each phase of crime control, removing
the need to make lynching a federal crime or for FDR to publically support the NAACP’s
anti-lynching  campaign.  In  light  of  this,  FDR’s  lack  of  public  endorsement  for  the
Costigan-Wagner bill cannot merely be explained away as a lack of interest in the issue.
The President did not simply ignore lynching because it was politically expedient to do
so. Instead, FDR was active in shaping his own anti-lynching strategy, it was just not the
one the NAACP advocated. But unless these speeches were read and interpreted side by
side, the thrust of FDR’s arguments would have been easily missed. The speeches were
spaced out over the period of a year and to make things even less clear, his speeches were
never solely about lynching. His anti-lynching rhetoric was presented alongside other
New Deal reforms—especially in his State of the Union speech and his address to the
crime conference. Additionally, FDR’s words were just that—words. During his first term
he offered no tangible  policies  that  directly  related to  lynching.  For  this  reason the
NAACP could not understand why FDR would not speak out in favour of their bill given
his denouncement of lynching and clear statements that the federal government should
assume responsibility for the practice.
 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Opposition to Lynching
22 Bearing in mind that FDR did not firmly situate lynching within his crime control rhetoric
until long after the Costigan-Wagner bill was introduced into Congress in January 1934,
the NAACP pursued presidential endorsement for their anti-lynching bill during this time
on the basis that FDR firmly denounced lynching in December 1933 and January 1934. But
as Walter White’s biographer, Janken, noted that as the Costigan-Wagner bill progressed
through Congress, “getting FDR’s attention, however, was becoming more difficult, as his
staff  who  were  more  favourably  disposed  to  southern  politicians,  tried  to  filter  out
African American perspectives from the President’s attention.”xxxiii White was forced to
look for alternative channels through which to access the president. It was for this reason
that White forged a relationship with the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, to establish an
informal route to the president.
23 During the campaign for the Costigan-Wagner bill, whenever White required action
from the White House, he would ask Eleanor Roosevelt to try to sway FDR around to his
way of thinking. White urged Mrs. Roosevelt to soften FDR’s objections to the Costigan-
Wagner bill, persuade him to insist on congressional votes, to get her to arrange meetings
with the president for him, to make appearances and speeches at numerous events, to get
FDR to  speak out  against  lynching or  in  support  of  anti-lynching legislation,  and to
present FDR with articles or information regarding lynching.xxxiv But if FDR opposed the
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NAACP’s anti-lynching legislation because he had his own vision to bring lynching under
the  control  of  the  federal  government,  then  Mrs.  Roosevelt’s  communications  with
Walter White had very different consequences to those previously argued. This section
therefore reinterprets Mrs.  Roosevelt’s communications with Walter White in light of
FDR’s speeches on lynching in the early 1930s. Accordingly, it argues that Mrs. Roosevelt
achieved two key things in her communication with Walter White. Firstly, she reaffirmed
the notion that the administration opposed lynching.  This was consistent with FDR’s
rhetoric,  and  led  Walter  White  to  persist  in  seeking  FDR’s  endorsement.  But  in
communicating that message to White, she also unofficially placed the administration in
favour of anti-lynching legislation. 
24 In communicating with Walter White over anti-lynching legislation, Mrs. Roosevelt
pushed  the  boundaries  of  the  First  Lady’s  involvement  in  White  House  politics  and
established her own role as First Lady. In her autobiography Mrs. Roosevelt said that all
she expected of her husband during his presidency was “that [the administration] would
be interested in accomplishing the things that should be accomplished since government
is supposed to serve the good of the people.”xxxv In bringing lynching and the NAACP to
FDR’s attention, Mrs. Roosevelt positioned herself as FDR’s conscience, and nudged him to
consider marginalised issues of national importance.  
25 Mrs. Roosevelt built upon her political experiences during the 1920s to communicate
with the NAACP. In the previous decade Mrs. Roosevelt was a member of the Women’s
Trade Union League and the Women’s  City  Club of  New York,  formed to  coordinate
middle-class  female  reformers  in  New  York  City.  She  was  also  in  the  New  York
Democratic Party and acted as a facilitator between female reformers in the social justice
feminist  movement  and  male  politicians.xxxvi She  knew  the  importance  of  building
relationships  between  reformers  and  politicians  to  form  coalitions  and  successful
political partnerships in order to enable legislative reform. She built on her skills in the
women’s reform movement and lent her experience to facilitate a relationship between
the  NAACP  and  FDR’s  administration  later  in  the  1930s.  Just  as Mrs.  Roosevelt  had
expanded the role of women in national politics a decade before by pushing to include
reform issues within the Democratic Party, Mrs. Roosevelt expanded the role of First Lady
to  advocate  for  specific  reforms  that  she  thought  her  husband  should  champion  as
President.   
26 With this experience behind her Mrs. Roosevelt corresponded with Walter White on
issues that concerned their drive to push a federal anti-lynching bill through Congress. It
is important to start by noting that Mrs. Roosevelt was aware of FDR’s position on the
Costigan-Wagner bill. FDR had personally informed his wife of his objections to such a bill
when she asked him if he would ask Congress to pass an anti-lynching bill on behalf of the
NAACP. FDR replied in a memorandum, “In view of the simple fact that I keep repeating
to Senate and House leaders that the White House asks only three things of this Congress
(appropriations, a tax bill and a relief bill)… I think that no exceptions can be made at this
session.”xxxvii While  the First  Lady openly communicated these objections to  White  it
highlighted that Mrs. Roosevelt knew of FDR’s stance against the NAACP’s bill, and that
any comments made that did not align with this stance were entirely her own.
27 Despite this, Mrs. Roosevelt had a tendency to give a hopeful spin to each situation
when  she  relayed  FDR’s  refusals  to  accede  to  the  NAACP’s  demands.  Minor
embellishments to FDR’s words gave the NAACP hope of action on FDR’s part when he had
committed to no such thing. When communicating FDR’s message that he would not ask
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Congress to push through the Costigan-Wagner bill she said to White, “[FDR] says, in view
of the fact that he is only asking three things of Congress, he does not see how he could
specify this particular bill.” But in the same message she also speculated on FDR’s actions:
“Of course he is quite willing that it should be pushed by Congress itself, and I feel quite
sure he will give it any help he can.”xxxviii FDR did not say that he was willing to help the
bill in his memorandum to the First Lady. But in trying to give the NAACP a positive
outlook  she  alluded  to  potential  presidential  action  to  help  the  bill.  Placing  the
administration in favour of anti-lynching legislation has previously been considered to be
a positive consequence of her correspondence. However, it becomes problematic if FDR
did not actually support the Costigan-Wagner bill and had his own ideas about how to
bring lynching under the remit of the federal government.
28 With little direct access to the President, White’s only way to gauge the President’s
position  on  the  anti-lynching  bill  was  through  Mrs.  Roosevelt’s  correspondence.
Fortunately for White, the First Lady frequently relayed FDR’s hopes for the NAACP’s bill.
After a particularly brutal lynching in Marianna, Florida, in which black farmhand Claude
Neal was lynched for the suspected rape and murder of local white girl Lola Cannidy,
White sent reports of the Association’s investigation into the lynching to highlight the
NAACP’s case for legislative reform and dispute claims that an anti-lynching law was not
needed.xxxix In the hope that details of this gruesome lynching would sway the president
in the Costigan-Wagner bill’s favour, White contacted Mrs. Roosevelt to champion the bill
on their behalf. She replied, “I talked with the President yesterday about your letter and
he said that he hoped very much to get the Costigan-Wagner Bill passed in the coming
session. The Marianna lynching was a horrible thing.”xl She continued to suggest that FDR
supported  anti-lynching  legislation  and  on  more  than  one  occasion  Mrs.  Roosevelt
suggested that FDR was “going to do everything he could” to get the Costigan-Wagner bill
passed, that he was working “quietly to avoid raising too much opposition to the bill.”xli
In doing so, Mrs. Roosevelt’s correspondence implied that FDR was taking an active role
in aiding the passage of the Costigan-Wagner bill. Continuously denouncing the crime
and alluding to presidential action gave the NAACP hope that FDR was on their side and
had an interest in seeing the Costigan-Wagner bill passed because of a genuine interest in
seeing an end to the crime.
29 Furthermore,  with  the  intention  of  being  optimistic  after  the  Neal  lynching,  in
addition to speculating on her husband’s actions, Mrs. Roosevelt also speculated about
the actions of the Department of Justice in response to the lynching in 1934. The NAACP
demanded action from the DOJ  on the case because Neal  was taken from his  cell  in
Alabama and across state lines by lynchers to Florida, where Neal was later killed. The
NAACP attempt to get Attorney General Cummings to act under the 1934 amendment to
the Lindbergh Kidnapping Act—part  of  FDR’s  legislative  program for  crime control—
which enabled federal action “for ransom or reward or otherwise.” Cummings did not
yield to the NAACP’s requests. “I have serious doubts,” he wrote in an internal memo,
“whether a court, bearing in mind that is it a criminal statute, would give it so sweeping
an interpretation,” because he did not believe that Congress passed a Kidnapping statute
wide enough in scope to use in the prosecution of lynching.xlii Despite this, and without
contacting the DOJ to determine their official stance, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote to White, “I
wish very much the Department of Justice might come to a different point of view and I
think possibly they will.”xliii White was overjoyed after reading the First Lady’s letter. It
“brightens  the  scene  immensely,”  he  replied,  “in  bringing  us  good  news  that  the
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President  is  hoping to  get  the Costigan-Wagner  bill  passed in the coming session of
Congress and that the Department of Justice may act in the Claude Neal case.”xliv Mrs.
Roosevelt’s  wishful  thinking  only  set  Walter  White  and  the  NAACP  up  for  further
disappointment when both FDR and the DOJ continued to take no action.
30 But by instilling the NAACP with hope about future federal action, it actually delayed
progress on their broader anti-lynching campaign. As the NAACP saw the opportunity for
federal action, the Association continued to invest time, money, and effort in pursuing
legislative avenues that the administration did not support—and would be difficult to
push through Congress without open public support by FDR. However, the Association’s
reactions  show  that  the  NAACP  had  great  trust  in  the  First  Lady  and  her  insider
knowledge. She had a great personal ability to form positive political alliances. However,
Mrs. Roosevelt was clearly ill-informed on the stance of the DOJ, and regularly told Walter
White that FDR hoped the bill would pass when he personally advocated for alternative
solutions. They trusted her suggestions over their years of experience in communicating
with the White House and the constant rejection they faced from federal law enforcement
agencies in their attempts to bring lynchers to justice.
31 After  the  Costigan-Wagner  bill  fell  victim  to  a  filibuster  in  1935,  Roosevelt’s
administration was clearly taken aback about Walter White’s reaction to the situation,
and in particular FDR’s  continued silence on the bill.  Stephen Early commented that
“Frankly, some of [White’s] messages to the President have been decidedly insulting.”xlv
In response to FDR’s silence on their anti-lynching bill White resigned from his position
as member of  the Advisory Council  for the Government of  the Virgin Islands.  In his
resignation letter, White wrote,
32  It is a matter of great disappointment that you as President
did not see your way clear to make a public pronouncement
by means of a message to the Senate or otherwise, giving your
open endorsement to the anti-lynching bill… It is my belief
that the utterly shameless filibuster could not have withstood
the pressure of public opinion had you spoken out against it…
In justice to the cause I  serve I  cannot continue to remain
even a small part of your official family.xlvi
33 White’s  reaction  was  telling  of  his  expectations  of  the  President.  Ultimately,  Mrs.
Roosevelt’s reassuring letters led Walter White to place greater faith in the President
than he should have. White had been expecting the presidential action that the First Lady
had suggested and was outraged enough to resign his position in protest when that did
not transpire. By implying the administration was in favour of the NAACP’s anti-lynching
bill, Mrs. Roosevelt only set White up for disappointment when FDR remained silent.
34 Mrs. Roosevelt specifically told White that FDR wanted to see the bill passed and that
he hoped that it would pass. Even though she did not specifically say that FDR would
actively work to get the bill passed, she did not tell Walter White that FDR would not
work to get the bill  passed either. This left the task of interpreting her letters up to
Walter White. Desperate for any scrap of presidential support, White therefore took any
positive  message  he  received  from Mrs.  Roosevelt  as  confirming  his  belief  that  FDR
wanted to see the bill passed. White wrote once that “I know personally of the President’s
deep interest in lynching and of his desire to see the Costigan-Wagner bill passed.”xlvii
This was a belief that Mrs. Roosevelt had reassured him of whenever FDR’s stance was
questioned. But FDR had specifically said that he could not ask Congress to pass the bill,
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and his speeches on crime control suggest that he had his own anti-lynching agenda that
conflicted with the NAACP’s methods.  White’s resignation from his position indicated
that FDR had not acted in the way that the Secretary had expected, in large part because
Mrs. Roosevelt had not adequately managed the Secretary’s expectations, and on some




35 FDR’s  anti-lynching  rhetoric  suggested  that  he  wanted  to  bring  lynching  under  the
control of the federal government on his own terms, and not those of the NAACP. This
gives an alternative explanation to his silence on the NAACP’s bill. Instead of remaining
silent to avoid controversial subjects when he needed the support of southern senators to
pass his  New Deal  measures,  FDR instead laid the foundations for alternative federal
action that did not involve the civil rights organisation.
36 FDR may have publicly denounced lynching in his speech to the FCC, in his State of
the Union address in 1934, as well as at the Attorney General’s Conference on Crime, but
he  never  spoke  out  publically  in  favour  of  anti-lynching  legislation.  There  was  a
disjuncture between the NAACP’s solution to lynching and what FDR suggested. Instead of
support  the  Costigan-Wagner  bill  or  make  lynching  a  federal  crime,  FDR  laid  the
foundations  for  how  he  would  tackle  lynching.  FDR  rhetorically  assuming  federal
responsibility for mob murder by arguing that lynching was a problem of the function of
government. FDR therefore aimed to solve lynching by making the different aspects of
crime control and criminal justice, from crime prevention to prosecution, more effective.
Unfortunately FDR left no paper trail regarding policy initiatives for his anti-lynching
strategy. Only FDR’s public speeches remain, but the rhetorical patterns present in these
speeches are consistent with how FDR constructed rhetorical narratives to support his
other legislative proposals.xlviii
37 Instead  of  destroy  the  NAACP’s  hope  of  realising  their  objective  of  securing
presidential endorsement for their federal anti-lynching bill, Eleanor Roosevelt offered
the NAACP hope despite knowing that FDR would not endorse bill. In suggesting that the
executive branch would take more action than they actually did, and subtly placing the
administrations in favour of anti-lynching legislation, Mrs. Roosevelt raised the NAACP’s
expectations  towards  the  administration.  Consequently,  NAACP  leaders  became  ever
more frustrated when FDR did not speak out in favour of  their bill.  Mrs.  Roosevelt’s
communications  therefore  did  not  have  entirely  positive  consequences  for  the
administration. While black Americans may have seen the First Lady’s engagement with
the lynching issue as a symbol of friendship, in this case it only made the NAACP more
sceptical of FDR’s ability to ensure that the civil rights of black Americans were protected.
38 The First Lady had a great ability to gain the trust, friendship, and support of black
leaders within the NAACP. She made them feel as though they were heard, even if she
could  achieve  little  for  their  anti-lynching  bill  personally.  But  Mrs.  Roosevelt  was
successful in bringing the NAACP’s reform movement to the President’s attention, and it
was important to her that FDR heard the Association’s arguments for an anti-lynching
bill,  even if  he did not  agree with them. This  reflected her ability to build her own
positive relations with reformers, although this did not translate seamlessly when she
tried to bridge the gap between the NAACP and the Roosevelt  administration.  But it
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showed  how  Mrs.  Roosevelt  applied  her  knowledge  of  political  reform  to  aid  anti-
lynching activists achieve their legislative objectives.
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ABSTRACTS
This article looks at Eleanor Roosevelt’s role in the 1930s anti-lynching movement. In particular,
the article  reinterprets  the impact  of  Mrs.  Roosevelt’s  role  as  conduit  between FDR and the
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People. This article proposes that Mrs.
Roosevelt’s  correspondence  should  be  re-contextualised  around  a  fresh  interpretation  of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s stance on lynching. In light of this, Eleanor Roosevelt’s early
attempts  at  domestic  diplomacy between FDR and the NAACP did not  have entirely  positive
consequences.
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